[ Lieut-Col. G. J. S. Scovell, Cameron Highlanders, later deputy Director-General of Recruiting. ] Typed paper, with autograph corrections, titled: 'Essay on the Causes of the South African War, 1899-1902, With the lessons learnt from it'.

Educated at Haileybury and Sandhurst, Scovell was gazetted to the Cameron Highlanders in 1900 and served with the regiment in the latter part of the Boer War (his diaries for the period being among material offered separately). The present paper is well-written and the fruit of experience. Scovell's views were clearly well-received, as he was appointed deputy Director-General of Recruiting at the end of the First World War. For more information about Scovell, see his entry in 'Who Was Who', and his obituary in The Times, 29 April 1948. The present item is 32pp., 4to. On the rectos of 32 leaves, and tied with black ribbon into grey paper wraps, with typed title on cover. With autograph emendations throughout, mostly of a minor nature, but including a footnote. The essay is carefully arranged, with two main sections titled 'The Causes of the South African War 1899-1902' and 'The Lessons of the Campaign'. The first section is subdivided under four 'headings': 'Early History of South Africa to the Annexation by Sir Theophilus Shepstone in 1877', 'From the Annexation till the conclusion of the First Boer War', 'From the First Boer War to the JAMESON RAID' and 'The JAMESON RAID to the opening of the FINAL WAR.' The second section, 'The Lessons of the Campaign', is subdivided into five parts: 'Strategical lessons of the South African War', 'New Experiences gained by the Artillery in the Campaign', 'New Experiences gained by Cavalry in Tactics and Training', 'Tactical lessons as learnt by the Infantry Arm' and 'A few General Lessons taught by the War'. The second section also contains parts headed 'Infantry in Attack', 'In the Defence' and 'The Maxim Gun'. Scovell is by no means an unthinking defender of Empire. In the first section he describes 'a series of mistakes committed by the British Government. Broken promises, unsuitable officials, a semi-military regime, with its harshness and its contempt for national prejudices, a neglect to convene the Volksraad, and to hold fresh elections', all causing 'the greatest dissatisfaction, but not before the benefits looked forward to by the Boers, as a result of annexation, had been reaped, such as thesettlement of the Zulu question; the alleviation of taxation, and the settlement of the National Debt'. He considers Cecil Rhodes's support for the Jameson Raid 'perfectly unjustifiable and quite inexcusable in a man who was both head of the Chartered Company and Premier of Cape Colony': 'However harsh and unconstitutional had been the treatment of the Uitlanders, however disgraceful had been the behaviour of the Transvaal Government, nothing can condone such an unprincipled and scandalous raid as that carried out by the headstrong Dr Jameson on New Year's Day 1896, which ended so disastrously for him at Doornkop.' The second section, the fruit of first-hand experience, is of great interest, with Scovell discussing 'new types of weapon', including 'pom-pom, or one inch Vickers-Nordenfelt', as well as the use by the Boers of 'every conceivable type of stratagem in concealing their own positions', and the inadequacy of the Medical Department. He condemns the Army Service Corps as 'under-officered and incapable of sudden expansion', as well as 'the ordinary British Officer's utter ignorance of finance' (he recommends the creation of 'Finance Officers' to 'accompany all armies in the field'). The paper ends with a discussion of the 'remount question', the 'lesson for the future' being to 'Send out suitable and honest individuals, civilians or soldiers, to buy remounts in the best markets in the world [...] the state must provide itself with a Remount Department, whose primary duty is to have a thorough knowledge of the requirements of any campaign in any locality, with the best markets and the usual price to be paid [...] This could be arranged by agreement with the Indian Authorities, as done in South Africa, during the latter stages of the war, when Native troops were employed in this work at the base.'