[Lord Salisbury's Foreign Office and 1897 insurrection in Crete.] Five Autograph Items by Sir Martin Gosselin of British Embassy in Paris, including drafts of private despatches to Salisbury on meetings with French Foreign Minister Gabriel Hanotaux.

Author: 
Sir Martin Gosselin, diplomat [Cretan insurrection of 1897; Lord Salisbury; Crete; Ottoman Empire; Gabriel Hanotaux; International Squadron; Admirals' Council; Great Powers; Greece]
Publication details: 
The five items written by Gosselin between April and November 1897, from the British Embassy in Paris.
£650.00
SKU: 22410

In January 1897 an insurrection by the Greeks in Crete led to the Ottoman Empire, of which it was still part, declaring war on Greece. The following month, as Turkish rule over the island crumbled, six 'Great Powers', including Britain, France, Russia and the Germans, despatched an 'International Squadron' of their ships to Cretan waters. The present material dates from the period following the occupation of the island by soldiers from five of the 'Powers' in March and April 1897, with Crete being temporarily governed by an 'Admirals' Council' made up of senior naval officers from the expedition. The five items are from the diplomatic papers of Sir Martin Le Marchant Hadsley Gosselin (1847-1905), for whom see the Oxford DNB, and are written between April and November 1897, at which point Gosselin was Secretary to the British Embassy in Paris, with the additional title of Minister Plenipotentiary. Three of the five items are addressed to Lord Salisbury who, in his third ministry, was choosing to serve as both Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. All five are in Gosselin's autograph. They are in good condition, lightly aged. They comprise: two drafts of private despatches to Lord Salisbury, both giving detailed reports of conversations Gosselin has had with the French Foreign Minister Gabriel Hanotaux (1853-1944) regarding the 'Governorship of Crete'. The two conversations touch on several interesting points: the 'Admirals', the future of the Turkish garrisons in Crete, and Hanotaux's reconsideration of his support for Salisbury's position that that 'no territory inhabited by Christians sh[ould]. ever be replaced under Turkish Rule'. The main topic is the suggestion by the Swiss minister in Paris Charles Édouard Lardy (1847-1923) that two possible candidates for the governorship are his two compatriots Numa Droz (1844-1899), President of the Switzerland, 1881-1887, or Emil Frey (1838-1922). The third item is a copy of a memorandum by Gosselin, written following a meeting with Lardy to discuss the suggestion, in which Lardy gives his assessments of Droz and Frey. The fourth and fifth items are: a private memorandum by Gosselin, apparently for his own purposes, and a copy of a letter to Salisbury, both concerning Droz's refusal of the position, and the new candidate put forward by 'the Powers', Colonel Charles Schaefer of Luxemburg, who had previously served with the police in Egypt, and whose appointment would not acceptable to the Cretans. ONE and TWO: Two Autograph Drafts by Gosselin of private despatches from him to Lord Salisbury, both from the British Embassy in Paris, 4 April and 26 June 1897, both on official letterheads, and each marked 'Private' at head of first page. Both have deletions and emendations, the second more than the first. ONE: 4 April 1897. 7pp, folio, Endorsed: 'Crete | reports conversation w M Hanotaux as to Governorship'. He begins by explaining that he was unable to give an immediate answer to Salisbury's telegram of the previous day, 'as it was only last evening at 7.20, that we received the repetition of Sir Ph. Currie's telegram reporting the proposals of the Ambassadors at the meeting on the 2d. inst.' He continues: 'Even had I received it earlier, it wd. have been impossible to see M Hanotaux yesterday afternoon as he was engaged in answering questions on Crete, Tokar & Madagascar in the Chamber.' Gosselin saw Hanotaux that morning, and has sent 'a full telegraphic report of his remarks direct to you, & also to the F.O.' He does not have 'much to add to the telegram: M. Hanotaux is strongly in favour of entrusting the ad interim Governorship of Crete to the admirals - who, as he told me the other day he considers far & away the best specimens of the European Concert: he declined to give a positive answer as to the adoption of the "Bulgarian System," giving the Electors of the future Ruler of Crete to the Assembly, without consulting, as he said, his colleagues at the next Cabinet Council.' Gosselin believes that what Hanotaux 'is really waiting for is to learn how the Russian Govt. regard this proposal'. He notes that 'the Assembly is not yet in existence, and there must be some sort of a provisional Govt. appointed, to supersede the still legitimate authority of the Vali, to raise a loan, & to enroll a constabulary'. He turns to 'M. Lardy, the Swiss minister here', who had mentioned the name of M. Droz - ex-President of the Swiss Republic as a possible candidate for the post of Governor of Crete - Mr. Droz is an able administrator, a Protestant [...] M. Hanotaux said that - always supposing the Admirals were not a possible solution - he had himself thought of M Frey who is I believe the President of another of the Internl. Bureaus but that if M. Droz wd. accept the post, he would be perhaps a still better man; & while I was at the F. O. he telephoned to M. Lardy to call on him this afternoon to discuss the subject.' Among subjects of neutral powers. Hanotaux would 'like to see a Swiss appointed', and Gosselin thinks, '(though he did not expressly say so) that he intends to propose to raise in Switzerland the 2000 Constabulary alluded to in my telegram of Yesterday for Service in Crete', and this explains Hanotaux's preference for Swiss governor. If the scheme were accepted, Gosselin thinks that 'the President of the Board would be the Italian, Admiral Canevaro'. He discusses the background of Canevaro, a former Peruvian citizen. Hanotaux stated that 'the Russian proposal - to the effect that in case of an outbreak of hostilities on the Greek frontier, the aggressor sh. be held responsible - must be regarded as a "démarche amicale" on the part of the Powers: & that under these circs, it would be out of the Question, to blockade the Greek littoral - & still less to intern the Greek fleet in the Bay of Salamis or at the Piraeus, until at all events the result of this final attempt of the Powers to prevent a breach of the peace is known.' Hanotaux 'begged' Gosselin to ask Salisbury 'to telegraph direct to [?] the assent of H M Gt to the Prussian Proposal, as the dangerous anniversary of Greek Independence is close at hand (April 6.)' TWO: 26 June 1897. 5pp, folio. Endorsed: 'Turco-Greek Peace Negotiations & Turkish Garrisons in Crete: Mr Hanotaux inclined to make Concession on both points to Turkey.' Gosselin reports to Salisbury the substance of a 'long conversation' he had with Hanotaux the previous day, during which he 'enquired what news he had to give me of the progress of the peace negotiations at Const[antino]ple'. Hanotaux replies that the ambassadors are 'apparently hard at work, but that nothing definite had yet been settled as to the future boundaries of Thessaly', and that the question 'must be left to be thrashed out by the Military Experts on the spot'. The instructions given by the French Foreign Office to their ambassador 'M. Cambron', i.e. Paul Cambron (1843-1924), were 'to hold fast to the formula of a strategic unification of the frontier: but Mr. Hanotaux said that, if at the last moment it was found necessary, in order to come to terms with the Turk, to transfer a few villages inhabited by Greek Christians, he was in favour of making some concession, & yielding the point'. Gosselin continues his report of Hanotaux's position: 'The Great object Europe has in view is the reëstablishment of peace, & the fate of one or 2 Villages could not be allowed to outweigh this paramount object.' Hanotaux had not yet communicated his views to Cambron, and 'begged' Gosselin 'to regard them as strictly confidential & not to report them to Y. L. in an official despatch'. Here a passage is deleted: 'it was essential that it should be kept secret from the Porte, [i.e. the Turks] & he begged me not to report it in an official despatch'. Hanotaux also expressed 'great anxiety that it sh. not be alluded to later on in any Blue Book, evidently with the fear of what the French Philhellenic party might say, should his views become known.' An passage inserted here reports Hanotaux's hope that should the negotiations be 'conducted expeditiously', the French Parliamentary session 'could be closed, without a public interpellation on Greek Affairs'. Regarding a despatch from the British Ambassador in Paris Sir Edmund Monson (1834-1909), Gosselin states that at the time it was written Hanotaux 'entirely accepted the formula laid down by Y[our]. L[ordship]. that "no territory inhabited by Christians sh. ever be replaced under Turkish Rule." | He is now apparently prepared, if necessary, to recede somewhat from this principle, & to give a larger interpretation than he originally intended to the formula of a strategic notification'. A passage interpolated here reads: 'He added that, if it sh. eventually be found necessary to cede a few Xtian. Villiages, the inhabitants sh. receive compensation out of the indemnity & be allowed to emigrate across the new Greek frontier.' The body of the despatch resumes with Gosselin stating that he has 'noticed, too, a somewhat similar modification with regard to M. Hanotaux's views as to Crete'. He gives his view of the matter: 'It was originally proposed that the Turkish garrisons in the island sh. be gradually withdrawn, as some of the local Gendarmery was sufficiently organized to ensure the tranquillity of the island'. He turns to 'the 6 points proposed by the Fr. Govt. for the settlement of the Cretan question', noting that while no mention was made of 'the withdrawal of the Turkish garrisons', 'the Turkish troops "are to be concentrated in a certain number of places in the island"'. On this point Hanotaux 'went a step further & said that in his opinion the future of the Turkish Garrison in Crete should be left entirely for settlement by the new Governor: he holds that the international Contingents sh. remain in their present positions, as long as [may] be required, but he would reduce the interference of the Powers to a minimum and would give the Governor a free hand as to the concentration or withdrawal of the Turkish Garrison.' Gosselin concludes: 'It remains to be seen whether this policy, if adopted, will satisfy the Cretan Autonomists.' In the margin beside this he adds: 'or be regarded by them as a [due?] Execution of the promises made to them by Europe'. THREE: Autograph Copy by Gosselin of his 'Memo | April 8./97', headed 'My dft No. 255. [Corress?] of April 5. 97' Signed with initials at end: 'M. G | April 8.' Gosselin begins the memo: 'M. Lardy called here this Afternoon. | He told me that M. Hanotaux had spoken to him about Frey & Droz for the Provisional Govship. of Crete: | Lardy says Frey only left the War Dept. at Berne a few weeks ago: he served in the American North - & South War. was taken prisoner by the Southerners & was a hostage for a year: a very good soldier, "très bel homme" but hardly a good administrator: He was shelved by his Govt. & given the Intern[ationa]l Telegraph Bureau. | He does not think that he wd. be the man the Powers want.' Regarding Droz, Hanotaux 'thinks he is too big a man - & holds too important a position in Switzerland to take a Provisional Appt. wh. would necessitate his throwing up his present appt of Pt of the Intern[ationa]l Railway Bureau'. Gosselin reports Hanotaux's view that Droz 'wd. be an excellent Govor: but [next passage underlined and emphasised in red pencil] expressly said that the appt. would not last for long - as far as he could at present judge: & they both agreed that under these circs, it could not well be offered to Droz.' Gosselin emphasises that 'Lardy especially begged that his name sh. not be mentioned in the matter: Droz is not well with the Swiss Govt. - having beaten them as them on their pet socialist scheme - of a state bank: Mier. Droz is also a great invalid, & this might be another obstacle to his accepting the post even if offered.' FOUR: Autograph Memorandum by Gosselin, the final passage suggesting that it was made for his own purposes rather than transmission. On official letterhead, without date, place, or heading, but dating from the same time as the next item, 5 November 1897. 3pp, 12mo. Starts: 'Lardy told me this Aftn. that Hanotaux told him last Wednesday that the Powers were not agreed as to Schaeffer's candidature & that he hoped Droz wd. not announce publicly his definite refusal. I cannot help thinking that there is some hanky panky going on about this, more especially as I hear that the Russians regret Droz very much.' He concludes: 'Hanotaux may be afraid of the press campaign here. | Mr Lardy begged that I wd. not mention what he told me.' FIVE: Autograph Copy of letter from Gosselin to Salisbury, signed with initials 'M. G.' On official paper, dated from the British Embassy, Paris, 5 November 1897. 4pp, 12mo. Begins: 'Dear Lord Salisbury. | There would seem to be still some hitch in the candidature of Colonel Schaefer for the Cretan Governorship which I have endeavoured to explain in an official despatch of today's date, chiefly based on information fm. the Austrian Embassy here.' He has telegraphed the information that 'Hanotaux had told one of the foreign ministers here that the Powers were not [last word underlined] agreed as to Col S's candidature, & that he hoped M. Droz wd. not publicly announce his definite refusal was communicated by M. Lardy, the Swiss Minister here, to Mr. Lee, as M. Lardy particularly requested that the information sh. be treated as secret, I have not mentioned in the tel.' He concludes: 'I was unable to see M. H. today about his Lagos Hinterland & Riff Questions, as he has been all day at Versailles. in attendance on the G. Duke Vladimir: but he has just sent me a message asking me to call at the F. O. tomorrow'. In a postscript he writes: 'I sent in 2 "urgent" notes this morning about Lagos, & the Riffs'.